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Indiana University, Bloomington 
 
The modern novel, with its voice-throwing effects and promise of 
intersubjective experience, is a fundamentally spiritualist enterprise. Foundational 
criticism in narrative theory from Mikhail Bakhtin to Wayne Booth seeks to 
understand ways a unitary literary text may integrate wildly divergent voices: those 
of the author, the narrator, other characters, other texts. By attempting to account 
for narrational authority (or its absence), Booth’s 1961 The Rhetoric of Fiction 
helps set the stage for Roland Barthes’s “La mort de l’auteur” (“The Death of the 
Author”) of 1967/1968, which begins with the almost paradigmatically 
spiritualistic interrogation, “Who is speaking?”1 Representations of supernatural 
communication are, of course, as old as literature itself. Russell M. Goldfarb and 
Clare R. Goldfarb, however, make a crucial distinction with regard to spiritualism, 
which, they stipulate, “is concerned with the immortal souls of men, not with 
immortal beings called gods” (17). The Goldfarbs trace literary representations of 
communication with human spirits from Homer and Virgil through Dante and 
Shakespeare, noting as a crucial milestone the migration of such content, with the 
arrival of the Gothic novel, from poetry and drama to fiction (21). The publication 
of The Castle of Otranto in 1764 predates by a little under a century the birth of the 
modern spiritualist movement, generally understood to have begun, in America, 
with the 1848 “Rochester Rappings” confabulated by the Fox sisters of Hydesville, 
New York (Oppenheim 11). Tatiana Kontou and Sarah Willburn articulate as a 
“guiding principle” of the essays collected in their volume on nineteenth-century 
spiritualism the conviction that “spiritualism and the occult provide flexible 
allegories for many concepts that are distinctly modern—such as the permeability 
between remote places, instantaneous communication from afar, and the recording 
and reproduction of the historical past” (1). They further define spiritualism as a 
technology, one that occasions “a modern aesthetic that insists on 
commensurability between disparate people and things as well as the virtual 
immediacy enabled by many much more recent technical media” (1).  
Kontou and Willburn’s description of spiritualism’s oddly au courant 
technical aesthetic and of its insistence on “commensurability” should prick up the 
ears of Marcel Proust’s readers. Beginning with a reference to metempsychosis on 
the first page of Du côté de chez Swann (Swann’s Way) and continuing across the 
seven volumes of À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time), the 
reader encounters a pattern of imagery that includes references not just to 
reincarnation but to totemism, transmigration, karma, mediumship, automatism, 
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telepathy, astral projection, oracular magic, sorcery, and the occult.2 The 
functioning, as figuration, of these references is characteristically multivalent. In 
some ways, they are part and parcel of Proust’s apparent determination, aptly 
substantiated by Malcolm Bowie, to account in his metaphors for every conceivable 
area of human inquiry (Freud 52). They advance Proust’s project of conveying the 
fundamental strangeness of experience. They are also of a piece with the 
Recherche’s chronicling of the narrator’s disenchantment (a process, notably, that 
parallels the evolution of the narrator’s relationship with language). This last 
interpretation is complicated, however, by the fact that the references to spiritualism 
actually increase as the narrative progresses and reach maximum density in La 
Prisonnière (The Captive), the nadir of the narrator’s capacity for enchantment. 
One potential explanation has not been developed extensively in Proust criticism: 
the possibility that Proust adopts, as the French had done throughout the nineteenth 
century, figures such as reincarnation and spirit-communication in order to signal 
possibilities for transcendence and communal experience, casualties of the 
ascendance of scientific materialism and Enlightenment individualism.  
Spiritualism arrived in Europe during a century in which beliefs imported 
from the East increasingly interpenetrated post-Enlightenment rationalism. In 
Secular Spirituality, Lynn L. Sharp credits “contact with ‘the Orient’” at least in 
part for introducing the idea of metempsychosis and for opening the Western mind 
to “new conceptions of time and progress” (8).3 Particularly in France, spiritualism 
and its distinctively French variant Spiritism coalesced contemporaneously with the 
erosion of and retrenchment by religious and political authority. According to John 
Warne Monroe’s Laboratories of Faith, Spiritism’s founder Allan Kardec “shared 
the existential doubts common among the period’s free-thinkers, many of whom 
regretted the loss of their childhood Catholic faith” (98). Spiritism’s codification of 
Anglo-American techniques of spirit communication and astute compounding of 
spiritualism’s underlying beliefs with Eastern ideas like reincarnation occurred 
conterminously with an evolving understanding of consciousness as a consequence 
of embodiment; according to Spiritism’s fundamental Law of Progress, on “more 
elevated planets, like Jupiter . . . the physical aspects of existence became less 
important” (106). The historical causes underlying the Spiritists’ negotiation of an 
ascendant materialism and acknowledgement of the corporeal had by no means 
disappeared by the time Proust began writing. To demonstrate the significance of 
this fact, it is worthwhile to delve briefly into the history of Proust’s relationship 
with the proto-phenomenology of Henri Bergson. 
In an eve-of-publication interview with the journalist Élie-Joseph Bois, 
Proust had warned that Du côté de chez Swann would be dominated by the 
distinction between involuntary and voluntary memory, “distinction qui non 
seulement ne figure pas dans la philosophie de M. Bergson, mais est même 
contredite par elle” (Dreyfus 289) ‘a distinction that not only does not appear in 
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Bergson’s philosophy but is even contradicted by it.’4 Nearly a century later, 
Nathalie Aubert undertook actually to substantiate how involuntary memory is 
“contradicted by” Bergson’s philosophy. Aubert faults intertextual studies by 
Proust’s and Bergson’s contemporaries for their “psychologisme étroit” (133) 
‘narrow psychologism’ and offers her own parallel reading “à la lumière de la 
phénoménologie” (134) ‘in light of phenomenology.’5 While acknowledging that 
Bergson and Proust depart from a similar point in elaborating their independent 
theories of memory, Aubert shows that involuntary memory in Proust’s works is 
not, paradoxically, effortless. As Bergson writes in Matière et mémoire (Matter and 
Memory), the memory files away perceptions “[s]ans arrière-pensée d’utilité ou 
d’application pratique” (86) ‘[r]egardless of utility or of practical application’ (69). 
These perceptions may subsequently be brought to bear on specific physical 
situations and tasks through what Bergson calls “le souvenir-habitude” (91) ‘habit-
memory’ (74). Otherwise, they either “reste[nt] sous la dépendance de notre 
volonté” (94) ‘remain[s] dependent upon our will’ (77) or they arise of their own 
accord in moments when the inhibiting function of the brain is suppressed, as when 
the subject is distracted, asleep and dreaming, or facing a mortal crisis. This latter 
phenomenon (along with the seemingly automatic filing-away of every experience) 
Bergson calls “la mémoire spontanée” (90) ‘spontaneous memory’ (73). Aubert 
corrects critics who, misled by an illusion of symmetry between the paired terms 
“voluntary/involuntary” and “habitual/spontaneous,” mistake involuntary memory 
for a version of spontaneous memory (Aubert 142). Aubert correlates Proust’s 
“monde de sommeil” ‘world of sleep,’ in which images from the past appear 
unbidden before the mind while the body is immobilized, with Bergson’s 
spontaneous memory (143). But she insists that mémoire involontaire is not 
“spontaneous” in Bergson’s sense but is rather a function of the human’s dual status 
as subject and object of perception, a unity the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-
Ponty calls the “champ phénoménal” (66, italics in original) ‘phenomenal field’ 
(62, italics in original). Like souvenir-habitude, mémoire involontaire is 
inextricably linked with the exigencies of a body navigating the material world. 
Bergson’s interest is in abstracting mémoire-spontanée, “la mémoire par 
excellence” (Matière 89) ‘memory par excellence’ (72), from souvenir-habitude; 
doing so is “à la fois la conséquence théorique et la vérification expérimentale de 
notre théorie de la perception pure” (Matière 265) ‘both the theoretic consequence 
and the experimental verification of our theory of pure perception’ (232). From a 
phenomenological perspective, therefore, the end at which Bergson arrives (or at 
which he drives) fits a term employed by Merleau-Ponty in his critique of Cartesian 
philosophy: “la pensée du survol” (Aubert 148) ‘thought from above.’ With this 
concept, Merleau-Ponty questions any ideal of perception liberated from the living 
body, which functions to inhibit the reaction to a stimulus received (Aubert 138). 
In contrast, Aubert writes, “Proust indique d’emblée les dangers d’une intelligence 
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qui croit pouvoir se libérer de son enracinement en substituant au sens équivoque 
de sa vie une signification idéelle et peut-être mensongère” (146) ‘Proust 
emphasizes the fundamental risks of an intelligence that believes itself capable of 
transcending its rootedness by substituting a deceptive ideality for the equivocal 
apprehension of the senses.’ In Aubert’s account, Proust’s insistence on 
corporeality or “rootedness” places him more firmly than Bergson in the camp of 
the phenomenologists. 
The extent to which Proust is a phenomenologist before the fact is clear 
from a passage that begins with the narrator’s initial encounter at Balbec’s Grand-
Hôtel with “un personnage . . . qu'on appelait ‘lift’” (II.25) ‘a personage . . . known 
as “lift”’ (331). The metonymic identification of the human employee with the 
equipment he operates may result from a linguistic quirk, “une anglomanie mal 
informée” ‘an ill-judged piece of Anglomania’ of the sort that leads visitors in the 
Champs-Élysées to refer as “water-closets” to “ce qu’on appelle en Angleterre un 
lavabo” (I.483) ‘what in England they call a lavatory’ (88). In England the operator 
of the lift would have been called the lift-boy.6 Then again, it may reflect a willful 
conflation of person and machine. In any case, the narrator describes the lift 
operator “installé comme un photographe derrière son vitrage ou comme un 
organiste dans sa chambre” (II.25) ‘installed like a photographer behind his curtain 
[glass] or an organist in his loft’ (Grove 331), and his attempts to chat the latter up 
take the form of appeals (apparently at least partly sincere) to his professional 
vanity:  
 
j’adressai la parole au jeune organiste, artisan de mon voyage et compagnon 
de ma captivité, lequel continuait à tirer les registres de son instrument et à 
pousser les tuyaux. Je m’excusai de tenir autant de place, de lui donner 
tellement de peine, et lui demandai si je ne le gênais pas dans l’exercice 
d’un art à l’endroit duquel, pour flatter le virtuose, je fis plus que manifester 
de la curiosité, je confessai ma prédilection. (II.26) 
 
I addressed a few words to the young organist, artificer of my journey and 
my partner in captivity, who continued to manipulate the registers of his 
instrument and to finger the stops. I apologised for taking up so much room, 
for giving him so much trouble, and asked whether I was not obstructing 
him in the practice of an art in regard to which, in order to flatter the 
virtuoso, more than displaying curiosity, I confessed my strong attachment. 
(331) 
 
The skill of the driver in manipulating the controls is indistinguishable from the 
graceful movement of the machine itself; at a summons from the hotel director, the 
lift operator “se mit à descendre vers moi avec l’agilité d’un écureuil domestique, 
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industrieux et captif” (II.25) ‘began to descend towards me with the agility of a 
domestic, industrious and captive squirrel’ (331). It is difficult to understand what 
the narrator intends with this curious image; a contemporary reader might visualize 
a pet hamster propelling itself from inside a transparent plastic sphere. Clearly, 
though, the impression of agility is based on the precision and alacrity of the 
machine, but the operator’s symbiosis with that machine is so complete it has 
become impossible to say to which the quality of agility pertains. 
 In Phénoménologie de la perception (Phenomenology of Perception), 
Merleau-Ponty considers the relationship of the body with the space and objects 
that surround it. When visual, tactile, and intellectual functions are properly 
integrated, their coordinated action is symphonic. Merleau-Ponty describes the 
relative indifference of a virtuosic organist to the instrument provided for a 
performance: 
 
Entre l’essence musicale du morceau telle qu’elle est indiquée dans la 
partition et la musique qui effectivement résonne autour de l’orgue, une 
relation si directe s’établit que le corps de l’organiste et l’instrument ne sont 
plus que le lieu de passage de cette relation. Désormais la musique existe 
par soi et c’est par elle que tout le reste existe. (170) 
 
Between the musical essence of the piece as it is shown in the score and the 
notes which actually sound round the organ, so direct a relation is 
established that the organist’s body and his instrument are merely the 
medium of this relationship. Henceforth the music exists by itself and 
through it all the rest exists. (168) 
 
Such seamless integration is born of a familiarity conspicuously absent among the 
alien furnishings of the narrator’s hotel room: “Je levais à tout moment mes 
regards—que les objets de ma chambre de Paris ne gênaient pas plus que ne 
faisaient mes propres prunelles, car ils n’étaient plus que des annexes de mes 
organes, un agrandissement de moi-même” (II.27) ‘I kept raising my eyes—which 
the things in my room in Paris disturbed no more than did my eyelids themselves, 
for they were merely extensions of my organs, an enlargement of myself’ (Grove 
334). As in Merleau-Ponty’s account of the organist, habit brings objects 
populating the perceptual field into the subject’s phenomenal field, nullifying any 
distinction between the body and its surroundings. 
A phenomenological reading of the Recherche accounts for nearly all the 
experiential modalities reported by Proust’s narrator, whose understanding of the 
world is almost entirely mediated by language and the body and who subjects even 
those intuitions received through involuntary memory to rigorous intellectual 
analysis. It neglects, however (and Aubert seems to concede as much in her 
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acknowledgement of Proust’s monde de sommeil), what William James calls the 
“hidden self” (Bramble 36), varieties of experience that transcend language and are 
recalcitrant to the scrutiny of the intelligence. Encounters with the ineffable are 
typically associated in the Recherche with musical performance, and in elaborating 
them Proust has recourse, particularly frequently and insistently, to the language of 
spiritualism. Aubert traces the Recherche’s narrative voice to an atemporal void 
and writes that “il faut moins dire qu’il [le langage] s’enracine dans le corps que 
reconnaître à ce dernier une présence pré-conceptuelle . . . non pas un alphabet 
complet, mais une possibilité d’émergence parmi les signes qui miment et 
invoquent le monde” (145) ‘it is necessary less to say that it [language] is rooted in 
the body than to recognize in the latter a pre-conceptual presence . . . not a complete 
alphabet, but a possibility of emergence among the signs that gesture toward and 
invoke the world.’ For Aubert it is through the offices of language, a function of 
the body, that the narrator escapes the condition of an animal or “l’homme des 
cavernes” (I.5) ‘cave-dweller’ (Swann 7) lost in the wilderness between sleep and 
waking and becomes inserted in time. Proust’s conception of time may be different 
from Bergson’s but for both time is “la condition même de l’existence humaine” 
(148) ‘the very condition of human existence.’ Being human in turn enables 
relations with the material world and with the incarnate minds that inhabit it, an 
exchange Aubert calls “cette relation réciproque de co-appartenance” (146) ‘this 
reciprocal relationship of co-belonging.’ 
Before the non-human and the early human, Proust uses another image to 
illustrate the terrors of non- or almost-being: the revenant. Suddenly awakened, the 
narrator’s confused dreams seem hopelessly obscure, “comme après la 
métempsycose les pensées d’une existence antérieure” (I.3) ‘as the thoughts of a 
former existence must be to a reincarnate spirit’ (Swann 5). Aubert’s focus on 
language as the crux of the narrator’s encounter with the phenomenal world 
promises to help elucidate this early reference to spiritual return. Spiritualism, after 
all, depends on language (at least once its practitioners have graduated from turning 
tables to the planchette and automatic writing) to facilitate the (re)insertion of 
disincarnate minds into human time, establishing on their behalf a meaningful 
relationship with the material world and allowing them to experience, at least 
momentarily, the reciprocal co-belonging to which Aubert refers. The narrator’s 
identity is restored by his memory “non encore du lieu où j’étais, mais de quelques-
uns de ceux que j’avais habités et où j’aurais pu être” (I.5) ‘not yet of the place in 
which I was, but of various other places where I had lived, and might now very 
possibly be’ (Swann 7), and he passes “en une seconde par-dessus des siècles de 
civilisation” (I.6) ‘in a flash [over] centuries of civilization’ (7). The narrator speaks 
here of the “grand mystère de l’anéantissement et de la résurrection” ‘great mystery 
of extinction and resurrection’ in which we are “initiés presque toutes les nuits” 
(II.177) ‘initiated almost every night’ (Grove 545); the cycle of death and rebirth is 
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so central to Spiritist teaching that it will be useful to consider the movement’s role 
in the spiritual life of nineteenth-century France in order to help assess where in his 
subsequent references to spiritualism Proust has in mind its Kardecian variant. 
According to Monroe, the years encompassing the erection of Kardec’s 
tomb (1870), the Commune, and a gathering of Spiritists at Kardec’s grave (1875) 
so large it brought down upon the movement the full repressive authority of the 
Third Republic represent the high-water mark of Spiritism (150-52). Since “Un 
amour de Swann” (“Swann in Love”) recounts events that take place prior to the 
narrator’s birth (around 1881), this is roughly the period of the earliest events 
represented in the Recherche. On three occasions, Proust uses spirite, a term of art 
coined by Kardec (Monroe 96) for spiritualist operators and originally used more 
or less exclusively by and about Spiritists, as a synonym for médium ‘medium.’ 
Otherwise, Spiritism is mentioned only once, when the Norwegian philosopher 
infelicitously emends his allusion to “séances de spiritisme” ‘séances of 
spiritualism’ as “évocations spiritueuses” (III.322) ‘spirituous evocations’ (Sodom 
448). However, given the conventions governing capitalization of proper nouns in 
French and the fact that after the mid-1860s the words spiritualiste and spirite were 
used interchangeably in France (Monroe 105, 118), it is impossible to conclude 
whether Proust has Spiritism in mind in any given reference to mediumship in the 
Recherche. 
John Bramble notes that France was never as hospitable to spiritualism as 
were England and America, being otherwise disposed toward a pre- (or counter-) 
Revolutionary “tradition of irregular, Cabalistic Freemasonry” (63). Spiritism 
established continuity between spiritualist mysticism and these older “hermetic 
ideas” (Hess 72-73), possibly because it incorporated elements of a millenarian, 
charismatic cult as well as of a secret society (Cuchet 187-93). Spiritist concepts 
like périsprit, “a ‘semi-material’ link between” the “physical body” and “an 
immaterial soul” (Monroe 108), and Esprit faux savant, or “poseur spirit” (Monroe 
134), are notably absent in the Recherche and, perhaps not surprisingly, Proust and 
the narrator generally incline toward the feminine, domestic spiritualism of the 
Anglo-Americans rather than the masculine, public Spiritism of the French.7 (The 
two strains meet in Charlus, a character marked by numerous forms of hybridity. 
Charlus both advocates an ideal of musical performance as a species of spirit-
possession and claims affiliation with various arch-legitimist, homosocial, and 
mystically oriented secret societies.)8 Nevertheless, the occultic vocabulary of the 
Recherche imbibes from Spiritism a cosmology embracing both spirit 
communication and reincarnation and, crucially for the novel’s theme of artistic 
apprenticeship, reposing a Utopian faith in the two as vehicles toward human 
perfection. Spiritualism, broadly defined, supplies some of Proust’s most potent 
metaphors for artistic inspiration and expression but (in a seeming paradox, given 
the narrator’s successive renunciations of romantic love, friendship, and society in 
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favor of the solitary pursuit of art) Spiritism’s emphasis on social reintegration is 
also never entirely absent from Proustian supernaturalism. 
A passage in À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs (Within a Budding Grove) 
demonstrates that Proust’s imagery often bears the imprint of spiritualism even 
when that imprint is not explicitly acknowledged. The narrator follows a train of 
thought that initially connects the unknowability of the beloved other, Gilberte, 
with her dynamism, expressing a decidedly un-Bergsonian wish to fix her image: 
 
Peut-être aussi cette activité de tous les sens à la fois et qui essaye de 
connaître avec les regards seuls ce qui est au-delà d’eux, est-elle trop 
indulgente aux mille formes, à toutes les saveurs, aux mouvements de la 
personne vivante que d’habitude, quand nous n’aimons pas, nous 
immobilisons. (I.481) 
 
Perhaps, also, that activity of all the senses at once which yet endeavours to 
discover with the eyes alone what lies beyond them is over-indulgent to the 
myriad forms, to the different savours, to the movements of the living 
person whom as a rule, when we are not in love, we immobilise. (84) 
 
Fixity arrives only with the death of love. While love endures, the beloved’s “mille 
formes” present to the lover’s senses a bewildering nebula, and the “mouvements 
de la personne vivante” merge in a flow that indifference alone can stanch. Unlike 
Gilberte, Albertine’s “gentil spectre” (Clermont-Tonnerre 229) ‘charming ghost’ 
passes into the spirit world in full nebulosity (Bowie Stars 2, Freud 59) ensuring 
that she will remain forever a creature in flight. For the narrator there has never 
been a single Albertine, only innumerable Albertines (IV.1067): “Chacune était . . 
. attachée à un moment, à la date duquel je me trouvais replacé quand je la revoyais” 
(IV.70) ‘. . . each one was attached to a moment, to the date of which I found myself 
carried back when I saw again that particular Albertine’ (Captive 659). The radical 
instability of the beloved produces a mental image not unlike that of the spectral 
presences in Spiritist photographs: “Le modèle chéri . . . bouge; on n’en a jamais 
que des photographies manquées” (I.481) ‘. . . the beloved model does not stay still; 
and our mental photographs of it are always blurred’ (Grove 84). The blurriness of 
these “botched photographs,” like the “haziness” of Spiritist photographer Édouard 
Buguet’s images, functions as a guarantor of their supernatural status (Monroe 
176). Gilberte remains inaccessible even in the monde de sommeil, frustrating the 
narrator as might the failure of one bereaved to dream of the departed, “ainsi ceux 
qui ont perdu un être aimé qu’ils ne revoient jamais en dormant, s’exaspèrent de 
recontrer sans cesse dans leurs rêves tant de gens insupportables et que c’est déjà 
trop d’avoir connus dans l’état de veille” (I.481) ‘just as those who have lost a loved 
one whom they never see again in sleep, are enraged at meeting incessantly in their 
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dreams any number of insupportable people whom it is quite enough to have known 
in the waking world’ (85).9 Even though Proust speaks here of the failure of the 
departed to contact the dreamer, the language is nevertheless consistent with the 
discourse of Spiritism. Monroe writes that articles published in the Revue spirite 
invoked oneiric encounters of the kind that elude the narrator both to decouple such 
visitations from exclusive identification with “rare, spectacular manifestations,” 
connecting them instead with experiences relatable to all readers who have suffered 
a loss, and to give Spiritist “doctrine the emotional immediacy of sentimental 
fiction” (113). 
The distance separating the youthful narrator’s sentimentality from the 
reader’s sense of the content of the narrative produces irony that also extends to 
passages where references to spiritualism are more explicit. In Proust’s 
representations of spirit contact, the communications elicited run the gamut of 
inscrutability, which in one form is indistinguishable from inanity. By the time of 
the party at the home of the princesse de Guermantes, Legrandin’s conversation has 
deteriorated with age until he utters only infrequent “paroles qui avaient 
l’insignifiance de celles que disent les morts qu’on évoque” (IV.514) ‘remarks as 
trivial as those uttered by the spirits of the dead when we summon them to our 
presence’ (Regained 358). Aviva Briefel writes in “‘Freaks of Furniture’: The 
Useless Energy of Haunted Things” of a more-or-less contemporary conviction 
among the Victorians of “[t]he uselessness of spiritualism” (214). One period 
commentator Briefel quotes complains of the “imbecile consequences” of table-
turning (212). Proust’s narrator adopts a ghostbuster’s skepticism when he likens 
the contrast between the mummy before him and the Legrandin he had known to 
that between a spiritualist surrogate and the “homme brillant” (IV.514) ‘man who 
in his life-time was brilliant’ (359) being channeled. Notably, in both these 
instances, the unsatisfactory result of the spirit’s encounter with materiality is a 
failure of language. Communication effected through impact with or apportation of 
an object is limited to signaling the spirit’s mere presence or, at best, answering 
yes-or-no questions by following a rudimentary code. Similarly, simulating the 
brilliant man’s conversation calls for verbal flair and an actor’s skill and 
commitment, for qualities, in short, that the average spiritualist stand-in could not 
be expected to bring to every performance. 
When the secrets of the dead are not hopelessly inane, they may be, by 
contrast, too profound to be grasped by the living. In a passage earlier in Le Temps 
retrouvé (Time Regained) in which furloughed soldiers are said to resemble the 
summoned dead, the narrator conjectures that the experience of the front must be 
like physical death: so beyond the pale that it is incomprehensible in human terms. 
Saint-Loup is “comme ces morts que nous évoquons, qui nous apparaissent une 
seconde, que nous n’osons pas interroger et qui du reste pourraient tout au plus nous 
répondre: ‘Vous ne pourriez pas vous figurer’” (IV.336) ‘like phantoms whom we 
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summon from the dead, who appear to us for a second, whom we dare not question, 
and who could, in any case, only reply: “You cannot possibly imagine”’ (97). Here, 
notably, the narrator speculates what the spectral visitor might say could it but be 
induced to stay and speak. The content of this hypothetical message directly 
addresses the inadequacy of language to bridge the experiential gap separating the 
spirit from its summoner. The message fails because the messenger is unable, 
lacking a human host and therefore the instrument of language, to re-enter human 
time, and this durational incompatibility accounts in the first place for what the 
embodied human perceives as the spirit’s evanescence. 
Less transient spirits, like the composer Vinteuil’s, may be privy to secrets 
that are equally profound; those secrets are not necessarily any more reducible to 
language, at least the verbal kind, than those kept by the veterans of the trenches. 
As spiritual presences go, however, Vinteuil’s seems particularly determined to 
make itself heard. What appears to be the very first mention of mediumship in the 
Recherche occurs during a party at the home of the marquise de Saint-Euverte, 
when Vinteuil’s “little phrase” shakes “comme celui d’un médium le corps 
vraiment possédé du violoniste” (I.346) ‘like a medium’s the body of the violinist, 
“possessed” indeed’ (Swann 325). In a passage that Merleau-Ponty cites in 
connection with the image of the organist quoted above, the performers of 
Vinteuil’s sonata seem to be “beaucoup moins jouaient la petite phrase qu’ils 
n’exécutaient les rites exigés d’elle pour qu’elle apparût” (I.342) ‘not nearly so 
much playing the little phrase as performing the rites on which it insisted before it 
would consent to appear’ (321). In Merleau-Ponty’s account, the musician, like 
“[l]’homme concrètement pris” ‘[m]an taken as a concrete being,’ is “ce va-et-vient 
de l’existence qui tantôt se laisse être corporelle et tantôt se porte aux actes 
personnels” (104) ‘the movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows 
itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts’ (101). The 
performers of Vinteuil’s sonata, like the accomplished organist and the lift operator 
not only enact but embody the coordinated functioning of Bergson’s “deux 
mémoires, dont l’une imagine et dont l’autre répète [;] la seconde peut suppléer la 
première et souvent même en donner l’illusion” (Matière 87, italics in original) 
‘two memories, of which the one imagines [spontaneous memory] and the other 
repeats [habit-memory][;] the second may supply the place of the first and even 
sometimes be mistaken for it’ (70, italics in original). The familiar stimulus of the 
instrument and its integration with the performer’s “champs perceptifs et pratiques” 
(Merleau-Ponty 462) ‘perceptual and practical fields’ (469) allow the performer to 
function simultaneously in two temporal registers, that of the music and that of the 
performance. Otherwise unassimilable temporal registers are brought into dialogue 
as well in the foundational experience of mémoire involontaire, as the push of 
intellectual analysis counters the pull of sensory stimulus: “L’épisode de la 
madeleine est un moment analytique . . . où l’effort pour retrouver la signification 
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du plaisir éprouvé est clairement signalé dans le texte” (Aubert 142) ‘the madeleine 
episode is a moment of analysis . . . where[in] the effort to recover the meaning of 
the pleasure experienced is clearly signaled in the text.’ 
As signs, the rites of supplication to Vinteuil’s spirit function almost as 
reverse misdirection; the habitual actions are presented as simply part of the show, 
expected but ultimately unnecessary except as a way of distracting the audience 
from the fact of the music’s primordial existence. Immediately prior to this passage, 
the narrator analyzes, generally, the sound of the violin. The analysis explores ways 
the listener’s experience with other violins in the past contrasts with and conditions 
the irreducible specificity of the violin in its present manifestation. In the passage, 
the visual image of the violin is said to modify the very sound of the instrument, 
not just the listener’s understanding of it. In a performance, the violin’s siren call 
becomes audible and, if the instrument itself is not visible, the listener might be 
deceived as to the source of its contralto voice, perhaps thinking that a singer has 
entered the ensemble. If the listener is able to see only the instrument’s case, then 
the listener might be fooled, as in an exhibition of voice throwing, into believing 
that humble accessory to be the source of the sound (I.341). The violin recapitulates 
the theme of Vinteuil’s sonata, the little phrase, and Swann hears it “lui disant ce 
qu’elle avait à lui dire et dont il scrutait tous les mots” (I.342) ‘telling him what she 
had to say, every word of which he closely scanned’ (Swann 321). What is spoken 
is the “parole ineffable d’un seul absent, peut-être d’un mort . . . , s’exhalant au-
dessus des rites de ces officiants” (I.346-47) ‘ineffable utterance of one solitary 
man, absent, perhaps dead . . . , breathed out above the rites of those two 
hierophants’ (325). The sonata concluded, the two-hundred-ninety-nine or so other 
attendees appear stunned, and the impression may not be only Swann’s that 
Vinteuil’s genius “faisait de cette estrade où une âme était ainsi évoquée un des 
plus nobles autels où pût s’accomplir une cérémonie surnaturelle” (I.347) ‘made of 
that stage on which a soul was thus called into being one of the noblest altars on 
which a supernatural ceremony could be performed’ (325-26). 
Even the comtesse de Monteriender, “célèbre par ses naïvetés” ‘famed for 
her imbecilities,’ recognizes that a visitation has taken place almost, but not quite, 
on par with a previous gathering’s “tables tournantes” (I.347) ‘table-turning’ 
(326).10 The irony of the entire scene is in one sense loaded against Swann. Vinteuil, 
still very much alive at this point, seems to communicate with Swann through the 
spiritual agency of his music. The contradiction of Swann’s scrutinizing the 
“words” of Vinteuil’s message even though its parole is ineffable passes without 
remark. Swann recognizes that the revelations of the music could not “se résoudre 
en raisonnements” ‘be analyzed into any logical elements’: 
 
Mais . . . Swann tenait les motifs musicaux pour de véritables idées, d’un 
autre monde, d’un autre ordre, idées voilées de ténèbres, inconnues, 
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impénétrables à l’intelligence, mais qui n’en sont pas moins parfaitement 
distinctes les unes des autres, inégales entre elles de valeur et de 
signification. (I.343)  
 
But . . . Swann had regarded musical motifs as actual ideas, of another 
world, of another order, ideas veiled in shadows, unknown, impenetrable by 
the human mind, which none the less were perfectly distinct one from 
another, unequal among themselves in value and in significance. (322)  
 
Perhaps in this instance the imbecility of the comtesse resides less in her 
comparison of the performance to a séance than in her idea of the means by which 
the spirit has entered into materiality: the violin is less table tournante than table 
parlante, less a turning table than a speaking one. In the latter, rather than simply 
moving the table or causing its legs to rap the floor, the spirit creates vibrations in 
its wooden surface (as Vinteuil has done in the body of the violin) in order to 
communicate. 
Music is inarguably more nuanced than even the most elaborate dictation 
transcribed by medianimic amanuensis, though in both a substantial part of the 
message is “I am here,” a statement that, as Barthes would have it in “Introduction 
à l’analyse structurale des récits” (“Introduction to the Structural Analysis of 
Narratives”), takes place on “l’ordre performatif, selon lequel le sens d’une parole 
est l’acte même qui la profère” (97) ‘the performative plane, whereby the meaning 
of an utterance is the very act by which it is uttered’ (Image 114). Music, for Swann, 
is closer than tables parlantes to meeting the minimum requirements of a language, 
possessing as it does units of meaning whose individual significance is 
distinguishable, and therefore more conducive to expressing complex ideas. Yet the 
ideas remain veiled in tenebrous shadows. As Aubert has pointed out, however, the 
capacity for language latent in the body is not a complete alphabet; it is simply the 
potential for emergence into signification. The valences of Swann’s response to the 
music may be internally contradictory, but overall that response is consistent with 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the musical versus the verbal utterance. For 
Merleau-Ponty, any difference in the communicative value of the two is illusory; 
the spoken phrase no less than the musical one communicates only itself (219). 
Like the majority of the audience, the comtesse de Monteriender is 
impressed less by the spiritual dimension of the performance than she is 
“[é]merveillée par la virtuosité des exécutants” (I.347) ‘[d]azzled by the virtuosity 
of the performers’ (326). But virtuosity and mediumistic capacity are not 
substantially different, at least if one asks Charlus. For him the ability to channel 
the composer is crucial to musical performance: “[V]ous semblez ne pas apercevoir 
le côté médiumnimique de la chose” (III.396) ‘[Y]ou seem not to be aware of the 
mediumistic side’ (552) Charlus tells an unimpressed Morel in Sodome et 
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Gomorrhe (Sodom and Gomorrah). By the time the narrator hears Vinteuil’s septet 
for the first time in La Prisonnière, Vinteuil has entered the spirit realm and Morel, 
the soloist, has clearly grasped the “mediumistic” side of musical performance. On 
Spiritist mediumship, Monroe writes, “Like demonic possession or mystical 
ecstasy, the medium’s trance was a state observers perceived as liminal” (129). 
Morel is in all ways a marginal character. The son of a valet, he is a relentless social 
climber. Polyamorous, he couples freely with men and women, les invertis (inverts) 
and les gomorrhéennes (Gomorreans). The narrator observes of him that he 
“ressemblait à un vieux livre du Moyen Âge, plein d’erreurs, de traditions absurdes, 
d’obscénités[;] il était extraordinairement composite” (III.420) ‘resembled an old 
book of the Middle Ages, full of mistakes, of absurd traditions, of obscenities; he 
was extraordinarily composite’ (Sodom 587). It is precisely his fluidity that makes 
Morel such a gifted interpreter. An errant lock of Morel’s hair announcing the 
allegro vivace is this unfixed quality’s objective correlative. “[A]lors . . . la 
Mèche!” ‘[T]hen, the Forelock!’ Charlus enthuses, calling it “le signe de la 
révélation, même pour les plus obtus” (III.791) ‘a revelatory sign even for the most 
obtuse’ (Captive 383). 
Morel’s mediumship is abetted both by a text and, notably, by a lesbian. 
Indeed, the role of Mlle Vinteuil’s girlfriend in rescuing the septet from oblivion is 
difficult to understand without taking into account that, as a gomorrhéenne, she 
shares with Morel powers that assist her in deciphering the scribblings, “plus 
illisibles que des papyrus ponctués d’écriture cunéiforme” (III.766-67) ‘more 
illegible than strips of papyrus dotted with a cuneiform script’ (Captive 349-50), 
discovered posthumously in Vinteuil’s grimoire. Merleau-Ponty comments on the 
status of the text and its relation to the significatory value of the work: 
 
Un roman, un poème, un tableau, un morceau de musique sont des 
individus, c’est-à-dire des êtres où l’on ne peut distinguer l’expression de 
l’exprimé, dont le sens n’est accessible que par un contact direct et qui 
rayonnent leur signification sans quitter leur place temporelle et spatiale. 
(177) 
 
A novel, poem, picture or musical work are individuals, that is, beings in 
which the expression is indistinguishable from the thing expressed, their 
meaning, accessible only through direct contact, being radiated with no 
change of their temporal and spatial situation. (175) 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on the radical equivalence of systems of signification 
(fiction, poetry, painting, music) is a natural outcome of his refusal to acknowledge 
an ideal realm in which the work exists separately from its material embodiment, 
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and it helps ensure that the creative act resides permanently in Barthes’s 
“performative plane.” 
During the concert at the Verdurins the narrator reflects that it is when 
Vinteuil strives for variety of expression that the consistency of his voice is most 
apparent. Vinteuil’s distinctive voice is “une preuve de l’existence irréductiblement 
individuelle de l’âme” (III.761) ‘a proof of the irreducibly individual existence of 
the soul’ (341). His artistic signature is separated from that of other musicians by 
“une différence bien plus grande que celle que nous percevons entre la voix de deux 
personnes” ‘a difference far greater than that which we perceive between the voices 
of two people’:  
 
[U]ne véritable différence, celle qu’il y avait entre la pensée de tel musicien 
et les éternelles investigations de Vinteuil, la question qu’il se posa sous 
tant de formes, son habituelle spéculation, mais aussi débarrassée des 
formes analytiques du raisonnement que si elle s’était exercée dans le 
monde des anges, de sorte que nous pouvons en mesurer la profondeur, mais 
pas plus la traduire en langage humain que ne le peuvent les esprits 
désincarnés quand, évoqués par un médium, celui-ci les interroge sur les 
secrets de la mort. . . . (III.760)  
 
[T]he real difference that exists between the thought of this or that other 
composer and the eternal investigations of Vinteuil, the question that he put 
to himself in so many forms, his habitual speculation, but as free from 
analytical forms of reasoning as if it were being carried out in the world of 
the angels, so that we can gauge its depth, but no more translate it into 
human speech than can disembodied spirits when, evoked by a medium, 
they are questioned by him about the secrets of death. (341)  
 
Note that the spirits in question are, like the taciturn combat veterans, désincarnés. 
The narrator, in his nascent capacity as author and impelled by the insights made 
available through involuntary memory, is by contrast able through translation to 
convey those insights in human language. As the narrator says in Le Temps 
retrouvé, “Le devoir et la tâche d’un écrivain sont ceux d’un traducteur” (IV.469) 
‘The function and the task of a writer are those of a translator’ (291). 
The narrator shares with the spiritualists his sense of the nobility of 
translation. In a study of Anna Mary Howitt’s spirit drawings, Rachel Oberter 
writes: 
 
Translation was a common metaphor during the second half of the 
nineteenth century . . . but it had particular resonance for spiritualists, for 
whom it had multiple valences. Not only did it mean to decode, to mediate 
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between different systems of meanings, but it also meant to change state, to 
transmute, to leave the mortal self behind. . . . “Translate” was thus a 
dynamic term for the spiritualists, implying a creative act, one filled with 
hope for transformation. To translate the spirit language into terms that 
humans could understand was thus less about debasing the message and 
more about elevating the messenger. (342-43) 
 
Oberter reports that the middle-class intellectuals of Howitt’s circle distinguished 
between “spirit descending into matter” and “the sublimation of matter into spirit,” 
associating the first with theatrical spiritualist manifestations and the latter with 
clairvoyance and spirit-drawing (338). Oberter discusses the frailty of Howitt’s 
drawings, positing their evanescence as a function of their status as intermediaries 
between the spirit and human worlds, their status as matter undergoing sublimation. 
The texts of the Recherche are likewise intermediaries: material evidence of a 
communication with the spirit-world of memory and the physical trace of an ideal 
text toward which they eternally gesture (though, as Aubert reminds us, the ideal 
signification of one’s life might be deceptive11). The Celtic belief that a chance 
encounter can free a soul from its prison in a material object (I.43-44) is likewise 
an account of the sublimation of matter into spirit, exemplary not so much of the 
spiritualist’s need to concretize, and thus make demonstrable, emanations from the 
spirit-world as of the spirit’s desire to access the consciousness and linguistic 
capacity latent in matter. In Merleau-Ponty’s account, a poem is trapped in the 
materiality of the written text, where it “serait irrémédiablement perdu si son texte 
n’était exactement conservé; sa signification n’est pas libre et ne réside pas dans le 
ciel des idées: elle est enfermée entre le mots sur quelque papier fragile” (176) 
‘would be irrecoverably lost if its text were not preserved down to the last detail. 
Its meaning is not arbitrary and does not dwell in the firmament of ideas: it is locked 
in the words printed on some perishable page’ (174-75).  
The narrator’s twin insights that the immortality of involuntary memory 
persists “après la mort des êtres, après la destruction des choses” (I.46) ‘after the 
people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered’ (Swann 44) and that his 
own “livres eux aussi, comme mon être de chair, finiraient un jour par mourir” 
(IV.620) ‘books too, like my fleshly being, would in the end one day die’ (Regained 
524) define the limits of Proust’s exaltation of art in the Recherche. Charlus is the 
poet of the salons, “celui qui avait su dégager de la mondanité ambiante une sorte 
de poésie où il entrait de l’histoire, de la beauté , du pittoresque, du comique, de la 
frivole élégance” (IV.345) ‘the man who had been able to extract from the world 
of fashion a sort of essential poetry, which had in it elements of history, of beauty, 
of the picturesque, of the comic, of frivolous elegance’ (Regained 110), but he is 
ultimately an artiste manqué; his failure as an artist lies in the fact that he does not 
re-inscribe the poetry he detaches from the fashionable world in the materiality of 
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a text. The artwork is emphatically material and, being material, it is destined for 
oblivion. In Proust Among the Stars, Bowie writes that “[t]he work of art . . . is 
open pore by pore to its own extinction. . . . The artist trapped inside a death-
shadowed mind-world . . . seems at first to have two mutually exclusive futures: he 
can seek death . . . or he can seek to rejoin that world as an object among objects” 
(120). Curiously, Bergson had already suggested a bridge between these otherwise 
contradictory poles. On May 28, 1913, six months or so before the appearance of 
Swann, he delivered his inaugural lecture as president of the Society for Psychical 
Research. Published as “‘Fantômes de vivants’ et ‘recherche psychique’” 
(“‘Phantasms of the Living’ and Psychical Research”), the talk outlines some 
implications of Bergson’s philosophy, particularly as it is expressed in Matière et 
mémoire, for the work of the society. Since the perceptions that the individual 
consciousness files away are not stored in the brain,12 it is reasonable to believe 
they might be shared, if not among the living and the dead, then at least between 
two living beings, validating the sort of extrasensory perception Mme Cottard 
claims on behalf of Odette near the end of “Un amour de Swann”: “Rien n’est 
impossible à l’œil d’une amie” (I.370) ‘Nothing is impossible to the eye of a friend’ 
(347). As Bergson puts it, “Entre les diverses consciences pourraient s’accomplir à 
chaque instant des échanges, comparables aux phénomènes d’endosmose” (78) 
‘Between different minds there may be continually taking place [ex]changes 
analogous to the phenomena of endosmosis’ (97). The porous membrane that 
separates the work of art from the rest of the material world allows intersubjective 
exchange of the sort Bergson describes even as it admits the same forces of decay 
that destroy every human body. 
 In Le possible et le réel (“The Possible and the Real”) Bergson challenges 
the value of the possible as an ontological category. “[L]’artiste,” Bergson writes, 
“crée le possible en même temps que du réel quand il exécute son œuvre” (15) 
‘[T]he artist in executing his work is creating the possible as well as the real’ (121). 
In turn, the reader, viewer, performer, or listener participates in “cette création 
continue d’imprévisible nouveauté” (17) ‘this continuous creation of unforeseeable 
novelty’ (123) that Bergson insists on throughout his work. One need only 
contemplate the singularity of “Combray I” to find an unparalleled example of an 
artist simultaneously creating the possible and the real. Proust’s incantatory prose 
functions in the way that the performative utterance does for Barthes, speaking only 
itself. Its creator is no less “composite” than Morel; see Robert Dreyfus on “ses 
bizarreries” and “sa grâce” (74) ‘his eccentricities’ and ‘his charm.’ Like Merleau-
Ponty’s music, the Recherche exists for itself and through it everything else exists. 
But its fulfillment is the opportunity it provides to enter into symbiosis with the 
mind of a “passé maître” (III.420) ‘past master’ (Sodom 587)—one is tempted to 
say an ascended master. Such a moment is envisioned by the narrator during his 
epiphany in Le Temps retrouvé: “ [C]e livre essentiel, le seul livre vrai, un grand 
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écrivain n'a pas, dans le sens courant, à l'inventer puisqu'il existe déjà en chacun de 
nous, mais à le traduire” (IV.469) ‘[T]he essential, the only true book, though in 
the ordinary sense of the word it does not have to be “invented” by the great 
writer—for it exists already in each of us—has to be translated by him’ (291). For 
Walter Benjamin, Proust’s achievement recovers for modernity the Bardic role of 
the public storyteller (113). One effect, if not aim, of Proust’s osmotic art is a revival 







1. The question is as it appears in S/Z (begun in February 1968 [Œuvres 549]): “Qui 
parle?” (582) ‘Who is speaking?’ (41). “La mort de l’auteur” (first published in 
1967 in English as “The Death of the Author” [Œuvres, Table du tome II (1751)]) 
includes an adverb: “Qui parle ainsi?” (491) ‘Who is speaking thus?’ (Image 142). 
 
2. Totemism: “la croyance celtique que les âmes de ceux que nous avons perdus 
sont captives dans . . .une chose inanimée” (I.43-44) ‘the Celtic belief that the souls 
of those whom we have lost are held captive . . . in some inanimate object’ (Swann 
42); transmigration: “la transmigration des âmes” (II.176) ‘the transmigration of 
souls’ (Grove 545), “c’était, transmigrée en moi, . . . ma tante Léonie” (III.586) ‘a 
person . . . had transmigrated into me . . . my aunt Léonie’ (Captive 95-96); karma: 
“tout se passe dans notre vie comme si nous y entrions avec le faix d’obligations 
contractées dans une vie antérieure” (III.693) ‘everything is arranged in this life as 
though we entered it carrying a burden of obligations contracted in a former life’ 
(Captive 245); mediumship in at least eight passages of which the more significant 
are cited and discussed in the body of the essay; automatism: “le vieillissement 
d’une pensée moins maîtresse que jadis de ses réflexes et qui dans des instants 
d’automatisme laisse échapper un secret si soigneuesement enfoui pendant 
quarante ans” (III.715) ‘the ageing of a mind less master of its reflexes than in the 
past, which in moments of automatism lets out a secret that has been so carefully 
hidden for forty years’ (Captive 273); telepathy: “Si cela avait été, malgré ses 
radiotélépathies, comment Françoise l’aurait-elle su?” (III.606) ‘If this had been so, 
how, in spite of her telepathic powers, could Françoise have come to hear of it?’ 
(Captive 122-23); astral projection: “traverser les régions voisines de la vie . . . et 
atterrir brusquement au réveil” (III.370-71) ‘to . . . traverse the regions bordering 
on life . . . and come to earth suddenly at the point of awakening’ (Sodom 517), “un 
système plus vaste où les âmes se meuvent dans le temps comme les corps dans 
l’espace” (IV.137) ‘a vaster system in which souls move in time as bodies move in 
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space’ (Captive 751); oracular magic: “ronde de sorcières ou de nornes qui me 
prosait ses oracles” (II.78) ‘a ring of witches or of Norns who would propound their 
oracles to me’ (Grove 407); sorcery: “les murs et les divans répétaient des 
emblèmes de sorcellerie” (III.466) ‘the walls and couches everywhere repeated the 
emblems of sorcery’ (Sodom 654); the occult: “cette influence s’étendit 
naturellement à mes rêves d’occultisme” (IV.110) ‘that influence naturally 
extended to my thoughts about occultism’ (Captive 713). 
 
3. Sharp acknowledges that metempsychosis is not anathema to the Enlightenment, 
being present, in another form, in the writings of Wilhelm von Leibniz (8). 
 
4. Unattributed translations from the French are the author’s own. 
 
5. Aubert’s critique echoes in certain respects that of Georges Poulet, though the 
latter’s was advanced in the service of distinguishing Proust’s and Bergson’s 
conceptions of time. As Aubert does, Poulet notes the frequency with which “la 
mémoire proustienne” ‘Proustian memory’ has been identified with “la mémoire 
affective des psychologues” ‘the affective memory of the psychologists,’ but he 
insists that for Proust the sensory trigger only “nous ouvre un chemin en profondeur 
. . . [;] c’est à nous d’y avancer” (374) ‘opens to us a road through the depths . . . [;] 
it is up to us to advance on that road’ (298). 
 
6. Later this individual will be called “le lift” or “le liftier” in the French text (see, 
for example, IV.325) and “the lift-boy” in the English (Regained 81). 
 
7. Sharp is less inclined to problematize Spiritism’s in-part self-proclaimed 
feminine gendering than are Monroe and Cuchet. See for example her consideration 
of ways the movement’s female-identification provided an easy handle for critics 
in the scientific and religious press (68). 
 
8. Monroe suggests that between the dimensions of gender and politics that of 
gender is the more important in determining such affiliations. He writes of the 
Spiritist demographic that “[a]mong French men . . . –particularly those with 
republican sympathies—anticlerical skepticism was a defining characteristic of 
masculinity, and sociability revolved around secular organizations such as Masonic 
Lodges or sociétés savantes” (121-22). 
 
9. Following her departure, Albertine is, by contrast, continually present in the 
narrator’s dreams: “Je pensais tout le temps à Albertine en dormant” (IV.31) ‘I 
thought all the time of Albertine while I was asleep’ (Captive 604). 
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10. Admittedly, Mme Monteriender’s statement is ambiguous. Possibly she means 
something more along the lines of “since the days of the tables tournantes.” 
 
11. Bowie offers an alternative formulation of the same idea: “The redemptive 
power of art and the vanity of art are both to be recognised and no resolution 
between them is to be sought” (Stars 318). 
 
12. “[À] mon sens, le cerveau ne conserve pas les représentations ou images du 
passé ; il emmagasine simplement des habitudes motrices” (73) ‘In my view, the 
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